In his February article, Ukraine’s defeat and the fall of the West, Owen Jones argued that “if we were always going to end up at a point where Russia was going to take land, and Western leaders thought that, but claimed otherwise and made promises to Ukraine to keep the war going to achieving what they believed to be unachievable – well, what that means in terms of countless wasted lives is truly hideous“; noting that this has been in pursuit of what the Washington Post described as “a sensible, cold-blooded strategy for the United States — to attrit an adversary at low cost to America, while Ukraine was paying the butcher’s bill”.

We are now getting to that point.

The way the war ends, or is spun out, is of enormous consequence to whether Europe will remain locked in an escalatory spiral towards the fever dream of a further, wider, deeper – and suicidal – pan European war that infects the minds of General Staffs and newspaper editorial boards; or whether there is an attempt to find a sustainable modus vivendi with Russia that enables de escalation, avoids mutually assured destruction and dislocates Europe from the US imperative to shore up its slipping global dominance with ever more adventurist wars.

The media here reflexively dismisses Russia’s bottom lines for ending the war as “maximalist”; by definition unreasonable, to be dismissed with no further thought or examination. This is of a piece with their usual tactic of obscuring reality with adjectival clouds of emotive association, so it is vital for even those sections of the Left that have cheered on the war, and are still doing it even as a majority of Ukrianians want peace, to get beyond the emotional red mists and look seriously at what the Russians are actually proposing.

A majority of Ukrainains want peace.

These are the key points from the published text of the draft “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” that Russia presented to Biden in December 2021; and which the US/NATO dismissed out of hand and refused to discuss.

1. No further NATO expansion

• The US would commit to preventing further enlargement of NATO, specifically barring Ukraine and other former Soviet republics from joining the alliance.

• This also included a ban on NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

2. No Deployment of US Forces or Weapons in Certain Countries

• The treaty would forbid the US from deploying military forces or weaponry in countries that joined NATO after May 1997 (such as Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, and others).
• NATO infrastructure would have to be rolled back to pre-1997 locations.

3 Ban on Intermediate-Range Missiles

• Both Russia and the US would be prohibited from deploying ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in areas of their own territory where such missiles could strike the other’s territory.

4 Limit Military Maneuvers and Activities

• Limits on heavy bombers and surface warship deployments: Both sides would restrict the operation of heavy bombers and warships in areas from which they could strike targets on the other’s territory. (Note: In September 2020, Trump’s DOD authorized a B-52 to fly along the Ukrainian coast in the Black Sea.)

5 Nuclear Weapons Restrictions

• All nuclear weapons would be confined to each country’s own national territory. Neither side could deploy nuclear weapons outside its borders. (Note: US just sent a batch of nukes to England.)
• Withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe and elimination of existing infrastructure for their deployment abroad.

6 Mutual Security Pledge

• Each side would agree not to take any security measures that could undermine the core security interests of the other party.

7. Establishment of Consultation Mechanisms

• Proposals included the renewal or strengthening of direct consultation mechanisms, such as the NATO–Russia Council and the establishment of a crisis hotline.

8 Indivisibility of Security Principle

• Included a reaffirmation that the security of one state cannot come at the expense of the security of another, formalising Russia’s interpretation of the “indivisible security” concept.

The three questions that supporters of the Ukraine Solidarity Campaign should ask themselves is,

• which of of these proposals do you disagree with?
• Would an agreement on these lines be a viable way to end the war?
• Would an agreement on these lines have avoided it in the first place?